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Abstract
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"The discovery of America and that of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of
Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of
mankind. Their consequences have already been very great; but, in the short period of
between two and three centuries which has elapsed since these discoveries were made,
it is impossible that the whole extent of their consequences can have been seen. What
benefits or what misfortunes to mankind may hereafter results from those great events,
no human wisdom can foresee." (Adam Smith, 1789, Book IV, Chp. VII, Part. III,
page 590)
1. Introduction
The roots of the industrial revolution and the rise of the western world during the XIX
century are frequently traced to events that occurred during the mercantilist period of the
XVI and XVII centuries. For example, North (1981) emphasizes the rise of the Parliament
in England in the second half of the XVII century and its role in securing eﬃcient property
rights; North and Thomas (1973) stress the significant population growth during this period
as the engine of institutional changes; Mokyr (2002) highlights the scientific revolution of the
XVII century lead by Fracis Bacon writings; Weber (1905) emphasizes religion diﬀerences
that became apparent with the Protestant Reformation movements of the XVI and XVII
centuries. All these suspects share two things in common. They provide only a proximate,
as opposed to ultimate, explanations of the industrial revolution since these transformations
themselves call for an explanation. Second, they occurred shortly after what Adam Smith
called "the two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind":
the discovery of the New World and the passage to East Asia by the Cape of Good Hope.
The great discoveries at the end of the XV century, or The Great Discoveries for short,
provide a sort of genuine and massive exogenous shock that could potentially explain many
of the crucial economic, political, social, and cultural events that lead to the industrial
revolution. This view has been attributed to Adam Smith, but it is perhaps better described
by Raynal, a philosopher contemporaneous of Smith:
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"There has never been any event which has had more impact on the human race in
general and for Europeans in particular as that of the discovery of the new world,
and the passage to the Indies around the Cape of Good Hope. It was then when the
commercial revolution began, a revolution in the balance of power, and in the customs,
the industries and the government of every nation . ..[some nations that were of no
consequence are become powerful: others, that were the terror of Europe, have lost
their authority]... Everything changed and will go on changing. But will the changes
of the past and those that are to come, be useful to humanity? Will his condition be
better, or will be simply one of constant change?" (Raynal 1780. Cited by Outram, pg
57).
This paper develops a theory of comparative development driven by large persistent
shocks. The purpose is to provide a unified theoretical framework useful to rationalize the
diverse paths of institutional and economic development observed after the Great Discoveries
for both the colonies and the colonizers. The model formalizes the idea of North and Thomas
(1973) that population growth is the key parameter shift explaining institutional changes,
and the ideas of Engerman & Sokoloﬀ (ES, 1997) and Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson
(AJR 2001, 2002) regarding the role of initial endowments at the moment of the conquest
and optimal colonization strategies in explaining the diverse paths of developments among
colonies in the Americas, Africa and Asia.
I utilize the model to argue that the same ideas proposed by ES and AJR to explain
the reversal of fortunes among colonies such as Latin America and the United States, can
also explain the reversal of fortunes among European colonizers, in particular Spain and
Britain. Specifically, while Britain entered into a process of sustained economic growth and
institutional reforms, Spain stagnated after an initial period of prosperity. I concentrate on
Britain and Spain as they provide two polar cases of interest.
The focus of the paper is not on comparing competing theories that could explain these
observations, but in developing a unified theory of development for colonizers as well as
colonized based on the Great Discoveries. While diverse theories of comparative development
rely on proximate explanations such as diﬀerences in human capital, TFP, physical capital,
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institutions, religion, or culture, the theory put forward by ES and AJR relies on truly
exogenous forces where geography provided a set of initial conditions in the form of factor
endowments, but discovery and colonization shape the subsequent pattern of development,
what ES called "path influenced" development. ES and AJR focus on colonies, but a similar
theory has also been used in the past to explain the colonizers.
The main argument of the paper can be outlined in a rather simplistic way. After the
Great Discoveries the Spanish Crown evolved into a more centralized, bureaucratic, and
absolutist power for the same reasons that Latin American institutions did: the abundance
of labor and natural resources in the territories conquered by the Spaniards. This abundance
favored the establishment of extractive institutions in the colonies, but also strengthen the
Spanish Crown that could aﬀord to concentrate power and resources in few hands. On the
economic side, the abundance of natural resources also produced a chronic case of Dutch
disease in Spain, which delayed industrialization and growth.
In contrast, the English monarchy did not enjoy the bullion of the Spanish Crown, at
least not directly, due to its late arrival into the colonization era. Instead, it was left with
an expanded set of trading and exploitation opportunities in Africa, Europe, Asia, and the
New World that could only materialize if the monarchy and/or the English society provided
the proper incentives and rights to its citizens. The nature of the new economic opportu-
nities opened to Britain by the Great Discoveries empowered common citizens, created an
entrepreneurial base, and was conductive to a weaker monarchy that eventually lost power
to other forces represented in the Parliament.
This basic argument requires more elaboration to answer a multiplicity of questions that
arise. The plan of the paper is to address some key questions with the help of a tractable
model suitable for the period of analysis. The model economy is composed of two sectors, a
rural sector operating a Malthus technology, and an urban sector operating a Romer type of
technology. The urban technology exhibits increasing returns to scale due to specialization,
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as in Romer (1987). Moreover, population evolves endogenously in a Malthusian fashion, as
in Kremer (1993) and Hansen and Prescott (2002). We measure the degree of property right
protection, or "institutions", as the number of varieties produced in the urban sector. The
reason is that those varieties would not be produced by competitive firms and therefore the
society must grant some degree of protection (monopolistic power) for them to be produced.
Finally, we focus the analysis on the eﬃcient allocation of resources, and therefore, on eﬃcient
institutions. In our set up, institutions are endogenous.
The only state variable in the model is population size. The eﬃcient solution is charac-
terized by a threshold level of population. If population is below the threshold, Malthusian
stagnation is eﬃcient and locally stable. If population is above the threshold, sustained
economic growth is eﬃcient. Our model thus provides a formalization of North & Thomas’
thesis that "the predominant parameter shift which induced the institutional innovations
that account for the rise of the Western World was population growth" (1973, p. 8. See also
North 1981, and Boserup 1981).
Population, however, is not a parameter but a state variable in the model. Therefore,
the ultimate determinant of growth and industrialization in the model is not population
itself but shifts in productivity and/or demographic parameters. More precisely, the model
economy can scape Malthusian stagnation if there is a significant and persistent change in
the productivity of the urban and/or rural technologies, and/or in demographic parameters.
We argue that the Great Discoveries shitfted the key parameters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature,
Section 3 presents some relevant evidence, Section 4 sets up the model, Section 5 characterizes
the eﬃcient allocations, Section 6 uses the model to rationalize the experiences of Spain and
England after the Great Discoveries, Section 7 summarizes the main findings, and Section 8
concludes.
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2. Related Literature
The thesis that the industrial revolution had colonial origins is associated to Marx, and
more recently to Williams (1944), Wallerstein (1974), Gunder Frank (1978), and Samir Amir
(1974)1. They argue that profits from slavery, colonization, and overseas trade provided the
capital required for the industrial revolution. These ideas were successfully challenged in
seminal works by Engerman (1972), De Vries (1976), and O’Brien (1982), who show that
profits from these activities were minor relative to the overall capital accumulation at the
time2. Our model abstracts from capital accumulation and therefore, by construction, avoids
this critique since none of the eﬀects act through profits or capital accumulation. Instead,
the key variable is population size.
The thesis have been recently revived by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (AJR, 2005).
They provide evidence that the rise of Western Europe between 1500 and 1850 corresponds
mostly to Atlantic Europe, and that countries that benefited the most were those engaged
in colonialism and transoceanic trade. To overcome the critics regarding the minor role of
profits for European accumulation, AJR complement their argument with an amplification
mechanism: colonialism and trade facilitated institutional reforms favorable for economic
growth but only in countries with a tradition of placing checks on the monarchy. They
thus provide an alternative explanation for the divergence among european powers since,
they argue, England had more checks on the monarchy than Spain at the time of the Great
Discoveries.
AJR evidence is compelling but their particular hypothesis to explain the evidence is
controversial. Cameron for example argues that "Henry VIII (1509-47) was as much an
absolute monarch in England as any of his follow sovereigns were in their countries. But
whereas royal absolutism increased in most continental countries in the sixteenth and seven-
1A recent restatement is Blaut (1993).
2See also Bairoch (1993, Part II).
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teenth centuries, a contrary development occurred in England, resulting in the establishment
of a constitutional monarchy under parliamentary control after 1688" (1997, p. 157); North
and Thomas state that "with the Tudors, the English monarchy was at the zenith of its pow-
ers" (1973, p. 146); Also, Graves asserts that ".. at least until the seventeenth century, some
continental assemblies, such as the Cortes of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia, the Sicilian
Parlamento, and the Polish Sejm, wielded more authority, possessed stronger safeguards and
enjoyed greater privileges and liberties than their English counterpart" (2001, p. 1).
The alternative thesis put forward in this paper is consistent with the views of Raynal,
Cameron, and Graves among others. The thesis is that England’s institutional development
was itself a result of the Great Discoveries. Due to exact sequence of events that gave Spain
a first mover advantage, and the geographical position of Britain as a natural fortress right
in front of the Atlantic, the Great Discoveries did not aﬀect Spain and England symmetri-
cally. Instead, it opened very diﬀerent opportunities for each country which explain their
subsequence institutional and economic divergence. Thus, the amplification mechanism via
institutions is key in our model as in AJR, but its origin is diﬀerent. Another important
diﬀerence is that our theory assigns a central role to population growth, which plays no role
in AJR theory.
The works of Pomeraz (2000) and Landes (1998) give also support to the thesis in a
diﬀerent form. Pomeraz stresses the idea that the New World provided Europe with new
grounds for ecological relief that Asia did not have. Landes recognizes the importance of
the discoveries but only as a catalyzer. The idea that Spain suﬀered from a case of Dutch
disease is an old one and has recently supported by Landes (1998) and formally tested by
Drelichman (2005).
Regarding to the modelling approach, our work is related to a growing literature inter-
ested in applying stylized general equilibrium models to the study of the industrial revolution
(Goodfriend & McDermott 1995, Galor &Weil 2000, Stockey 2001, Hansen & Prescott 2001,
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Jones 2001). These models predict that the industrial revolution was inevitable due to either
exogenous technological progress or endogenous improvements driven ultimately by popula-
tion growth3. In our model the industrial revolution is not inevitable, but the result of a
large and persistent shock. Our model is more suitable to study North & Thomas or Smith
ideas. Moreover, models in which the industrial revolution is inevitable are silent about
questions like why the industrial revolution occurred in England, or why it happened in the
eighteen century. Our theory instead suggests an explanation for these questions.
Our model is also related to the "Big Push" theory of Murphy, Shleifer & Vishny (1989)
but conceptually diﬀerent. In their model, industrialization is always eﬃcient and the govern-
ment may induce industrialization by coordinating a "big" move toward the modern sector.
In our model, industrialization is not eﬃcient if the economy lacks suﬃcient population size.
Moreover, population is exogenous in their model but endogenous in our theory. Our model
is also related to Kremer (1995) in the key role of population size but in Kremer’s theory
stagnation is not possible. Our model is also related to Krugman (1991) in the production
structure, but diﬀerent in other respects and questions addressed. Finally, our theory also
formalize arguments by Wrigley (1967), and Jacobs (1984) regarding the importance of cities
for growth.
3. Evidence
Figure 1 and Table 1 present some of the evidence that motivates this study. For the
period 1400 to 1800, Figure 1 shows the share of urban population and the logs of population,
wages, rents, and prices in England. The graph suggests that a structural change took
place around 1500-1520. Specifically, during the XV century population, urban population,
and prices remained roughly constant, but after 1500-1520, the English economy is under
3An exception is Lucas (2001) who requires an exogenous shock aﬀecting the returns to human capital
accumulation.
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substantial transformation: population, real rents, and prices rise more or less systematically,
and real wages fall and then increase. The behavior of the economy up to 1640 is consistent
with the predictions of a Malthusian model.
Figure 1 suggests that another break took place around 1640. Although population
kept rising systematically, real wages also start rising systematically. This observation was
stressed by Clark (2005), who argues that England escaped Malthusian stagnation for the
first time in 1640. Another remarkable and robust observation illustrated in Figure 1 is the
systematic rise of urban population in England starting at around 1500. this is particularly
significant because AJR have used urban population as their preferred indicator of economic
growth. Figure 2 provides further evidence on this issue. It shows the rapid rise of London.
By 1500, London was the 17th largest city of Europe with around fifty thousand inhabitants.
By 1800, just at the outset of the industrial revolution, London was already the largest city in
Europe, the second largest in the world, and had a population of over 1.2 million inhabitants,
all in spite of a great fire in 1666 that destroyed most of the city.
Overall, the figures shows that the rise of Britain in the centuries following the discoveries
was impressive. By 1500, England was a small country of around 2.5 million people, and a
lightweight player in European aﬀairs dominated byMediterranean countries. Three hundred
years later, England’s population had increased 3.5 times while population in other European
powers scarcely doubled, Britain had became the major naval power in the world, and London
the largest city in Europe, soon to become the largest in the world.
Finally, Table 1 provides some figures for Britain and Spain compiled from diﬀerence
sources. Data for Spain is not as abundant as for Britain, and less reliable. The Table shows
that Spain experienced a jump in the growth rate of population and in per-capita GDP for
around a century after the discoveries, and then population and GDP mostly stagnated for
around a century (between 1600 to 1700). Also, its urbanization rate was not much aﬀected
by the great discoveries overall, and some reduction may have occurred initially. As for
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England, the data suggests a more systematic increase in its population and GDP after the
discoveries.
4. The Model
Consider an economy populated by Nt identical individuals and endowed with a fixed
amount of land L. Individuals live for one period. There are two final goods of production,
rural and urban goods, and It intermediate goods. Goods are non-storable. Population
growth follows a Malthus type of dynamics. To simplify notation, time subscripts are sup-
pressed whenever possible.
4.1. Production Technologies
Rural goods are produced according to:
Yr = zrF
r(Lr, Nr) (1)
where F r is a constant returns to scale technology in land, Lr, and labor, Nr, and zr is rural
total factor productivity. Urban goods are produced by combining I varieties of intermediate
goods, {xi}Ii=1, using the following increasing returns to scale technology:
Yu =
"
IX
i=1
xγi
#1/γ
− ψI (2)
where ψ is a fixed cost per variety and 1/(1 − γ) is the elasticity of substitution between
varieties, and 0 < γ ≤ 1. Intermediate goods are produced according to:
xi = zIF u(Ni, Li) (3)
where F u is a constant returns to scale technology in land, Li, and labor, Ni, and zI is a
productivity parameter common to all intermediate inputs. Denote f i(li) ≡ F i(li, 1), where
Malthus to Romer: On the Colonial Origins of the Industrial Revolution 11
li ≡ LiNi is land per-worker in sector i ∈ {r, u} and l ≡ LN . As a rule, lowercase variables
denote per-worker variables. Furthermore, assume that:
F i = LαiN1−αi for i = {r, u}. (4)
and that αr > αu so that the rural technology is more land intensive.
The following restriction on parameters would make endogenous growth possible, and
guarantee that land windfalls delay industrialization, as shown below.
Assumption 1: 1
2−αu/αr < γ <
1
1+αu
.
Note that if land is not used in the urban sector, αu = 0, this assumption becomes
1
2
< γ < 1.
4.2. Preferences
Individuals derive utility from a composite consumption good made of rural and urban
goods according to:
C = G(Yr, Yu) ≡
¡
Y θr + Y
θ
u
¢1/θ
(5)
where 1/(1− θ) is the elasticity of substitution between rural and urban goods and θ ≤ 1.
4.3. Population Dynamics
Population growth is Malthusian. Population, Nt, evolves according to:
Nt+1
Nt
= n(ct), (6)
where c ≡ CN is per-capita consumption, n(ct) is a diﬀerentiable function satisfying n(0) = 0,
crosses 1 only at a unique consumption level denoted c∗, is convex at c∗, single peaked,
and limc→∞n(c) = n > 1. The shape of the function n(·) is described in Figure 3.a. A
similar function is used by Kremer (1993) and Hansen & Prescott (2002). This specification
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allows to capture a demographic transition of the sort observed in the data: the relationship
between consumption and population growth reverses as consumption increases.
5. Eﬃcient Allocations and Eﬃcient Institutions
An eﬃcient allocation maximizes aggregate consumption, as defined by (5), subject to
(2)-(4) givenN and L. The choice variables are the allocation of land and labor across sectors
- rural and intermediates - and the number of varieties. The following Proposition states
that the eﬃcient allocation can be simplified to the choice of a single variable, nu ≡ NuN , the
share of labor in urban activities. Proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 An eﬃcient allocation solves the problem:
c(N) = max
0≤nu≤1
G
£
zrf
r(φlu(nu)) (1− nu) , zu (fu(lu(nu))nu)µNµ−1
¤
(7)
where c(N) is the eﬃcient amount of consumption per-capita, µ ≡ γ
2γ−1 , φ ≡
αr
1−αr
1−αu
αu
,
zu ≡
³
2γ−1
γ
´³
1−γ
γ
1
ψ
´ 1−γ
2γ−1
z
γ
2γ−1
I , and lu(nu) ≡ lφ(1−nu)+nu .
Two key parameters defined in Proposition 1 are µ and zu. µ is the degree of increasing
returns in the urban sector which only depends on the degree of substitutability between
intermediate inputs, γ. The more substitutable inputs are the lower the degree of increasing
returns (µ0(γ) < 0). By Assumption 1, µ (1− αu) > 1. This restriction guarantees that the
degree of increasing returns in the reproducible input, labor, is suﬃciently strong to overcome
the fixity of land. zu is the urban total factor productivity parameter (TFP), a function of
diﬀerent parameters in the model. In particular, zu increases with zI and decreases with ψ.
The eﬃcient allocation can be easily solved in a computer by directly maximizing (7)
over a grid of points in the unit interval. An analytical solution is complicated by the fact
that the problem is not convex and first order conditions may be misleading. To see this,
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define M(nu;N) as the function to be maximized in the right hand side of (7):
M(nu;N) ≡ G
£
zrf r(φlu(nu)) (1− nu) , zufu(lu(nu))µnµuNµ−1
¤
Figure 4 shows this function for values of nu in the horizontal axis, three possible values of
N (low, medium and large), and tree possible values of θ. Points A, B, and C in the three
panels correspond to the optimal choices of nu. These examples shows that the function M
is not necessarily concave, in fact it is convex for large values of θ and N , that it has interior
minimums and maximums, and that the maximizer may not be unique (compare points B
and D in second panel). Due to these issues, our strategy is to derive some intuition and
analytical results for the special case of θ = 1, and then provide quantitative analysis for the
more general case. As illustrated in Figure 4, if θ is large then an eﬃcient solution involves
either nu = 0 or nu = 1.
Nonetheless, the examples in Figure 4 illustrate two general properties of the solution.
First, the eﬃcient share of urban population (weakly) increases with total population. Sec-
ond, there is a discontinuity in the optimal share of urban population: as N increases, the
optimal share of urban population jumps from zero to a positive number. The larger θ the
larger the jump. This last property of the problem imposes some discipline for the choice of
θ in order to obtain sensible predictions on the share of urban population.
As argued in the introduction, the number of varieties I can be regarded as the "degree
of property rights protection" or "quality of institutions". The reason is that these varieties
would not be produced by pure competitive firms in a decentralized equilibrium due to the
fix cost of producing a variety. A decentralization would therefore require some degree of mo-
nopolistic power granted by the society, just as in Romer (1987). The following Proposition
describes the eﬃcient degree of protection.
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Proposition 2 The eﬃcient degree of property right protection, Ie, is given by:
Ie = I( neu|{z}
+
, N|{z}
+
; zI|{z}
+
) =
µ
1− γ
γ
zIfu(lu (neu))nuN
ψ
¶µ
.
where neu is the eﬃcient rate of urbanization.
According to the Proposition, the eﬃcient degree of protection increases with the eﬃcient
rate of urbanization, population size and the productivity of the urban sector.
5.1. Perfect Substitutes: θ = 1
If rural and urban goods are perfect substitutes then it is eﬃcient to allocate all factors
into a single technology, the one that produces more output. Given that the urban sector
exhibit increasing returns to scale, then either all or none of the factors must be allocated in
that sector. Denote bN the population size that makes this choice indiﬀerent: zrLαr bN1−αr =
zuLµαu bNµ(1−αu). Solving for bN produces:
bN = ∙zr
zu
Lαr−µαu
¸ 1
µ(1−αu)−1+αr
. (8)
Thus, the eﬃcient amount of percapita consumption satisfies:
c(N) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
zr(L/N)αr if N ≤ bN
zuLµαuNµ(1−αu)−1 if N > bN.
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
. (9)
Figure 3.b shows c(N) as a function of population size, N . The "V" shape of c(N) results
from two opposite forces. First, the rural technology exhibit decreasing returns to population
size due to the fixity of land; second, the urban technology exhibit increasing returns to scale.
For a small scale (N < bN), the eﬃcient economy is rural and decreasing returns prevail. But
for a large scale (N > bN), the eﬃcient economy is urban and increasing returns kick in.
Assumption 1 guarantees that µ (1− αu)− 1 + αr > 0 and αr − µαu > 0. Thus, an increase
in zrzu or L increases
bN. Denote bc = c( bN) the minimum eﬃcient level of consumption.
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Using Proposition 2, the degree of protection is given by:
Ie =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if N ≤ bN³
1−γ
γ
zIFu(L,N)
ψ
´µ
if N > bN.
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
.
Thus, no protection is eﬃcient as long as the economy is small and rural, but the switch to
the urban technology also requires to a jump in protection.
Equations (6) and (9) fully determines the eﬃcient allocation path for a given initial
population level, N0. Alternatively, the eﬃcient path is described by the diﬀerence equation:
Nt+1 = n(c(Nt))Nt. (10)
We now characterize the eﬃcient allocation. Consider first the steady states of this equation.
Notice that N = 0 is a steady state. Additional steady states exist if there are levels of
population such that n(c(N)) = 1. Since n(c) is required to satisfy n(c) = 1 at the single
value c = c∗, then additional steady states exist if c∗ = c(N) for some N > 0. Given that
c(N) is "V " shaped, this last equation have two solutions if c∗ > bc, no solution if c∗ < bc, or
one solution if c∗ = bc. Since the last case only occurs for a very particular set of parameters,
we only consider the first two cases.
5.1.1. Malthusian Stagnation (c∗ > bc)
The case c∗ > bc is illustrated in Figure 3.b. by the curve c(N). This curve crosses the
value c∗ at two levels of population: N∗ and N , where N∗ < N. In this case, there are two
additional steady states: (c∗,N∗) and (c∗,N). Direct inspection of the graphs reveal that the
only locally stable steady state is (c∗,N∗)4. In particular, for any N0 ∈ (0, N), Nt → N∗
and ct → c∗. If N0 > N, then Nt → ∞ and ct → ∞. In this last case, Nt eventually grows
4Since time is discrete, an additional regulary condition is required for (c∗,N∗) to be locally stable. By
linearizing (10) one obtains the condition |1−n0(cM )αrcM | < 1 for stability. This condition imposes a bound
on the size of n0(cM ) and is authomatically satisfied given our assumption that n(c) is convex around cM .
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at the constant rate n and percapita consumption eventually grows at the constant rate
(1 + n)µ(1−αu)−1 − 1 > 0.
We call the stable steady state Malthusian because it has all the properties of a typi-
cal Malthusian model: per-capita consumption is determined only by demographic factors
(by the condition n(c∗) = 1), and changes in technologies or land availability only aﬀects
population but not per-capita consumption.
5.1.2. Perpetual Growth (c∗ < bc)
Curve c0(N) in Figure 3.b illustrates the case in which no solution exist for the equation
n(c0(N)) = 1. The curve c0(N) lies above c∗ for all N . In this case, population always grows
and, regardless of its initial level, population eventually surpasses the level N , the economy
eventually fully urbanizes, and the growth rate of per-capita consumption asymptotically
approaches the rate (1 + n)µ(1−αu)−1 − 1 > 0. There is no possibility of stagnation in this
case.
5.1.3. Break from Malthusian Stagnation
Suppose parameters are such that c∗ > bc, so that stagnation is possible, and suppose
N0 = N∗ so that the economy is in the Malthusian steady state. Stagnation is eﬃcient
because the economy lacks suﬃcient population size to exploit the increasing returns to
scale technology. A break from stagnation may occur if circumstances change, say due to
discoveries of new territories, so that condition c∗ > bc ceases to be satisfied permanently or
for a suﬃciently long period of time. In that case, population increases systematically until
eventually surpasses the threshold level N . Once population has reached this critical level,
the economy can sustain economic growth even if parameters return to their original values,
say even if colonies attain independence.
More formally, according to the model the condition c∗ > bc may cease to hold in the
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following cases.
1. A positive demographic change that shifts the n(c) function upwards, say because
of a fall in the mortality rate, and causes c∗ to fall. This case is depicted in Figure
5.a where the level of consumption that guarantees zero population growth falls from
c∗ to c∗∗. After the demographic change, the curve c(N) lies above c∗∗, and Malthu-
sian stagnation is not a steady anymore. Instead, population systematically grows
and sustained economic growth eventually appears, after a transitory period of falling
consumption.
2. An upward shift in the urban technology. Figure 5.b shows the eﬀects of an
increase in the productivity of the urban sector, from zu to z0u. This shift produces
a new function c0(N) that lies lies above c∗. In particular, bc moves upward to bc0 >
c∗, again eliminating the Malthusian steady state. This change triggers immediate
industrialization and urbanization, and a process of sustained economic growth without
any temporary fall in consumption.
3. An upward shift in the rural technology. Figure 6.a shows the eﬀects of a posi-
tive change in rural productivity, from zr to z0r. This curve also induces the new c
0(N)
curve to lie above the level subsistence c∗ eliminating the Malthusian stagnation, and
triggering systematic population growth. The eﬀect is an initial boom in percapita con-
sumption followed by a period of falling consumption. The critical level of population
that triggers urbanization shifts to the right, from N to N
0
, which delays urbaniza-
tion and sustained economic growth. However, urbanization and economic growth
eventually occur.
4. A discovery of land. This discovery simultaneously shifts the urban and rural tech-
nologies, but under Assumption 1 the rural technology benefits the most. The net
Malthus to Romer: On the Colonial Origins of the Industrial Revolution 18
result is similar to the previous case with an initial consumption boom followed by a
recession. Industrialization, urbanization, and growth eventually occurs.
5.2. Imperfect Substitutes: θ < 1
If urban and rural goods are easily substitutable (θ is large) then the eﬃcient development
path involves a sudden switch from rural to urban goods as the scale of the economy increases.
However, if goods are not easily substitutable, then the eﬃcient path involves only gradual
substitution, or not substitution at all if the elasticity of substitution is 1 (θ = 0).
Figure 7 illustrates the c(N) function for an intermediate value of θ ∈ (0, 1). For the
case of gradual substitution, the c(N) curve has a "U" rather than a "V" shape. The figure
also illustrates two experiments: an upward shift in the rural technology and an upward
shift in the urban technology. In both cases, the whole curve c(N) shifts upward since all
eﬃcient allocations involves some production of both rural and urban goods. However, the
qualitative results are similar to the ones found in the previous section.
6. The First Great Divergence: An explanation
We now use the model to provide an explanation for the rise of Atlantic Europe after the
discoveries, and in particular to account for the diﬀerent experiences of Spain and England
after the XV century. AJR argue that pre-existing institutional diﬀerences among European
Atlantic economies are key to understand their diﬀerent development paths after the discov-
eries. However, as argued in Section 2, the idea that major institutional diﬀerences existed
before the great discoveries is controversial. Instead, authors such as Cameron and Graves,
suggest that the institutional, political, and social divergence among European powers also
arose after the XV century, and Raynals, a contemporaneous of Adam Smith, argued that
all these transformations originated in the Great Discoveries.
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The model of the previous sections suggests an alternative explanation for the rise of
Atlantic Europe as well as the variety of development paths observed after the discoveries,
and in particular the reversal of fortunes among European powers. The thesis is that the dis-
coveries did not aﬀected european powers symmetrically but in ways that prompted diﬀerent
development paths as argued, for example, by Landes:
"The industrial revolution made some countries richer and other (relative) poorer...
This process of selection actually began much earlier, during the age of discov-
ery. For some nations, Spain for example, the Opening of the World was an
invitation to wealth, pomp, and pretension.. For others, Holland and England,
it was a chance to do new things in new ways, to catch the wave of technological
progress." (1998, p. 168-69)
6.1. Spain and the Dutch Disease
"Spain, in other words, became (or stayed) poor because it had too much money."
(Landes1998, p. 173).
The great discoveries aﬀected European countries diﬀerently. Portugal and Spain, as the
initial discoverers, enjoyed a first movers advantage that was formalized by the Treaty of
Tordesillas of 1494. This treaty, sponsored by the Spanish born Pope Alexander VI, divided
the non-european world between Spain and Portugal. With a vast territory at its disposal,
Spain focused its conquest on the most prosperous and populated regions of the New World:
the areas of the Aztec, Inca, and Maya’s empires. The abundance of labor made possible for
the Spanish Crown to put in place a highly hierarchical system of institutions designed to
concentrate power in few hands, slave the indigenous population, and to extract and export
the maximum amount of resources to Europe. These included precious metals, sugar, spices,
luxuries, agricultural plants among others. The flow of resources made Spain Europe’s leader
during the XVI and early XVII centuries, a prominence that became even greater after the
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Portuguese King Sebastian I died and the Spanish King Phillip II claimed the Portuguese
trone in 1580.
Spain gradually lost its position during the early XVII century in the middle of multiple
wars and conflicts -the Italian wars, the Dutch revolt, the Anglo-Spanish war, war with
France, conflicts with the Ottoman Empire - and continuous piracy in the sea sponsored
particularly by England and the Dutchs. Overall, the great discoveries brought a period of
prosperity but they did not put Spain into a path of permanent growth.
Figure 8.a. provides a rationalization for these events. For Spain, the discoveries were
analogous to windfall of natural resources, say similar to the discovery of gas or oil reserves,
which prompted a case of Dutch disease. In terms of the model, the discoveries acted as a
positive and persistent productivity shock to the primary or rural sector. The higher pro-
ductivity shifted the c(N) curve upward to c0(N) but not enough as to eliminate stagnation
from being a steady state. In the short term, the economy experiences a boom, but over
time it returns to stagnation but with a higher population level.
Our theory is consistent with major developments of Spain during the three centuries
following the great discoveries. An economic boom followed by recession, a population boom,
and a degree of reversal in the urbanization rate. In the model, the degree of urbanization
may go either way because the higher productivity of the primary sector tend to reduce
urbanization, but larger population tend to increase it.
This simple story could be enriched by using a specific path for the productivity shock
that takes into account the gradual conquest of the new territories, the exploitation of its
resources, a peak in the exploitation, and then a gradual fall due to reduction in the bullion,
and successive military set backs against England, France and the Dutch that eventually
gained access to the new territories. A detailed quantitative analysis of the specific path is
left for future research.
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6.2. Britain
"The English came in the Indian Ocean, like the Hollanders, at the end of the
sixteenth century. They came as interlopers and plunderers, better at fighting
than trading. Only later, and then cautiously, did they shift to trade." (Landes,
1998, p. 152.)
Although Spain (and Portugal) gained an early advantage, other European countries also
benefited from the start directly or indirectly. For example, London’s growth during most
of the XVI century was in large part due to its role as satellite of Antwerp, the Belgium
city that became center of international commerce during the XVI century fueled in large
part by the bullion from the New World. A key turning point for England, and London in
particular, was the destruction of Antwerp in 1576 by a Spanish army. This made evident
the advantage of London as a center of commerce because its relative safety from continental
wars.
After years of conflicts with other European powers, England eventually emerged as the
major naval power in the Atlantic. A second turning point was the destruction of the Spanish
Armada in 1588 while attempting to invade England. England’s natural fortress proved to
be a major advantage in the race for military power. In fact, no foreign army had managed
to successfully invade England for almost one thousand years5.
Shortly after the Armada failure, England initiated its expansion in the new world estab-
lishing its first successful settlement in North America in 1607. By 1600, even before English
settlements were established in the New World, the discovery had already transformed Eng-
land significantly: London had already multiplied its size by a factor of more than three
becoming the fourth largest city in Europe. By 1776, when England colonies in America
declared independence and the industrial revolution was igniting, London was already the
largest city in Europe and the second largest in the world. Trade was the engine of growth
5The last successful invation of England was in 1066 by Norman forces.
Malthus to Romer: On the Colonial Origins of the Industrial Revolution 22
of England, and of London in particular:
"As sugar plantations spread on Barbados, Antigua, Jamaica, and in the eighteen
century, on St. Dominique, the volume of sugar exported to Europe skyrocketed.
Shipments to London rose from very low levels in 1640 to an average of 17,200 tons
in 1663-69, 19,0000 tons in 1699-1701 - when the price had fallen to half the 1640
level - and 46,000 tons in 1750-54... From 1600 to the American Revolution, New
World sugar production grew tenfold, from 20 to 200 thousand tons. Tobacco
production also grew enormously; after the initial glut in the 1640, demand grew
to permit English shipments to increase from 9 million pounds in the 1660s to
38 million pounds in 1699, and 55 million pounds in 1750." (De Vries, 1976, p.
139).
"London’s wealth came frommany sources, but its life-blood was trade, especially
overseas trade. ..In the early seventeenth century, London handled around 70
per cent (by value) of English foreign trade, and in 1700 its share was around
76 percent, with an even bigger share of imports and re-exported colonial goods.
... There had been significant diversification since 1640, when woollens had been
almost 90 percent of London exports... What changed the picture was the rapid
growth since 1660 of colonial trade with the North American and West Indian
planations, which sent molasses and sugar (London’s second most valuable import
in 1700, after linen), tobacco and dyes, and the East India Company’s imports of
calico, silk and pepper. London’s exports to the colonies were mainly cloth and
manufactures." (Inwood 1998, p. 317-18).
It is remarkable that London’s diversification since 1640 coincides with the observation
stressed by Clark (2005), who argues that England escaped Malthusian stagnation for the
first time in 1640.
Figure 8.b. provides a rationalization for these events. For England, the discoveries acted
as a positive and long lasting productivity shock to the urban sector. The higher productivity
shifted the c(N) curve upward to c0(N) enough to eliminate stagnation from being a steady
state. The model predicts that the economy would eventually sustain systematic economic
growth once its population reaches the critical size N
0
.
This theory is consistent with major developments of England during the three centuries
following the great discoveries: a systematic increase in the urban population, explained by
the positive urban productivity shock and the subsequent increase in population; an initial
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period after the discoveries during which the economy behaves as a Malthusian economy; and
a break down from Malthusian predictions once the economy starts growing systematically.
This simple story could be enriched by adding a specific path of productivity that takes
into account major developments during the colonization era such as the gradual coloniza-
tion, the outcome of wars, and independence of the colonizes among others. A detailed
quantitative analysis is left for future research.
7. Summary of Main Results
The analysis above produces four key contributions:
1. Population and growth. While dependency theories stress the eﬀects of colo-
nization, slavery and trade on physical capital accumulation in Europe, our theory suggests
that the key channel is the accumulation of human capital in the form of larger population.
This is a promising channel since in fact population growth was substantially larger after
the great discoveries, and population growth is the key "parameter shift" hypothesized by
North & Thomas. For example, according to Clark (2005), England’s population did not
grow between 1400 and 1500, but it multiplied by a factor of more than 3.5 between 1500
and 1800. The population channel is a powerful one and it has been overlooked by the critics
who focus on profits or the size of industrial exports to the colonies but are silent on the
flow of wages.
There are multiple ways the Great Discoveries stimulated population growth in Europe.
Clearly, the discoveries opened new trade and exploitation opportunities that translated into
new employment opportunities for Europeans in all kind of activities: military, trade, govern-
ment, industry, religion, piracy, among many. As Inwood describes "international merchants
were at the top of London’s commercial world, but the system which they dominated de-
pended upon the work of a far greater number of lesser traders, warehousemen, wholesalers,
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retailers, refiners, processors, drovers, travelling salesman, factors, middlemen, and dealers
of all sorts" (1998 p 324). Furthermore, commodities from the New World such as sugar,
high in calories, became an aﬀordable and popular commodity in Europe.
Thus, the great discoveries not only provided new profit opportunities for European
merchants, as dependency theories stress, but more importantly, new employment and wage
opportunities for european workers. These opportunities allowed to support larger families
and immigration, and expanded domestic markets. In particular, London experienced an
unprecedented surge of immigrants in the centuries following the discoveries.
2. Economic Divergence Among European Powers. The model suggests that the
arguments used by ES to explain the divergence among colonies after the discovery of the
New World, say U.S. vs. Mexico, can also explain the divergence among colonizers, say
England vs. Spain. Specifically, the model suggests that the initial prosperity and later
stagnation of Spain was a case of "Dutch disease". By discovering the New World, Spain
gained a first mover advantage over vast resources and a degree of monopoly power granted
by the Pope. Its optimal strategy was to colonize the rich and highly populated areas of
Latin America where they established extractive institutions. The bullion and resources
arriving to the empire acted as an increase in the productivity of the primary sector, the
rural sector in our model, that enriched Spain but shifted resources out of the industrial
sector, delaying industrialization, urbanization, and growth.
In the other hand, England late arrival left her with a vast amount of territory sparsely
populated in the New World, and with new trade opportunities in Africa, Europe, Asia and
the New World. Its access to the exploitation of primary resources was limited compared
to Spain, and the optimal colonizing and trade strategy was to open business opportunities
for ordinary citizens, and to promote migration to the new world under favorable condi-
tions. These new opportunities empowered ordinary citizens, lead to a more democratized
and equalitarian society in the colonies but also at home. On the economic side, the new
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economic opportunities were analogous to an increase in the productivity of the "urban sec-
tor" (commerce and industry) which favored urbanization, industrialization, and eventual
growth.
3. Institutional Divergence Among European Powers. The model also suggests
that the institutional divergences between England and Spain also obeyed to the underly-
ing economic conditions. The boom in the primary sector of the Spanish economy shifted
resources toward that sector weakening the urban and industrial sector and also weakening
our measure of institutions, as a lesser number of varieties needed to be produced. This is
the model’s rationalization for the increase in the absolutist power of the Spain Crown.
In contrast, Britain late arrival to the colonization era acted as a positive shock to the
urban and industrial sectors. This shock shifted resources toward the urban sector, and
improve our measure of institutions, the number of varieties produced. Our interpretation is
that the new opportunities oﬀered to Britain by the great discoveries favored commerce and
entrepreneurial activities, as well as strengthen property rights, making Britain gradually
more democratic, weakening the monarchy.
4. Accounting pitfalls. The analysis also uncovers potential pitfalls in using static
calculations of the type employed by O’Brien (1982), De Vries (1976), or Bairoch (1995) when
assessing the role of colonies for industrialization. They argue that the impact of colonies
on Britain was minor since most resources for capital accumulation originated domestically.
In the model, a temporary but suﬃciently lasting shock may induce enough population
growth to allow the economy scape stagnation. Once the shock disappears, the economy is
self-sustaining. Simple accounting calculations would assign all the subsequent growth to
domestic conditions and none to the shock. However, without the shock the economy would
have remained stagnated. Specifically, the model suggests that the population growth of
London was ignited by the Great Discoveries, but once London reached certain size, growth
there was self-sustaining even after the colonies were lost.
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To further illustrate the point, consider a reverse question, the influence of Europe on
U.S. output. Simple static calculations would assign most of the U.S. growth during the last
five centuries to domestic factors, little to the eﬀect of Europe. However, if one is interested
in ultimate determinants, it is very plausible that U.S. output today would be similar to the
one 500 years ago had not the discoveries yet occurred. If so, the role of Europe on current
U.S. output is fundamental.
8. Concluding Comments
The role of the Great Discoveries at the end of the XV century in igniting the industrial
revolution and the rise of the western world remains a controversial issue, particularly among
historians. Unfortunately, most of the discussion lacks formal models that spell out the as-
sumptions, the channels, and their quantitative implications. The contribution of this paper
is to provide a model suitable for the period of analysis that formalizes existing arguments
and sheds lights on new avenues.
By any measure the discovery of the New World in 1492 by Christopher Columbus is
still one of the major macroeconomic shocks in history, if not the major6. Almost overnight
the territorial size of the western world was multiplied by a factor of 4. The New World was
around three times larger than Europe, similar to the size of Asia, rich in natural resources
and fertile lands, and relatively easy to subdue by the superior military technology of the
Europeans. Equally impressive, the discovery of the passage by Cape of Good Hope shifted
the patterns of trade in the old world from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. It is hard
imagine better luck for the Atlantic economies, and in particular England, a natural fortress
situated in an enviable position in front of the Atlantic.
These facts motivate the theory explored in this paper. The working hypothesis is that
the Great Discoveries ignited major events that have occurred since, in particular, economic
6Earlier encounters by the Vikings remained largerly unkown to the rest of the world.
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growth and institutional changes. We study a model of growth where major shocks can ignite
perpetual economic growth. The model rationalizes the connection between population and
institutional change, and allows to disentangle some relevant channels at work.
We show that early critics pointing out the implausibility of the hypothesis based on the
weakness of the capital accumulation channel have overlooked other key channel, population,
and that their static method may be invalid for the dynamic question at hand. The paper
also shed some light on the endogenous institutional development themselves ignited by the
discoveries. Our analysis suggests that the biggest legacy of the Great Discoveries was an
expanded market size that took time to be built but that eventually enabled an industrial
revolution.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Given the symmetry of the problem regarding intermediate inputs
and the restriction γ ≤ 1, any eﬃcient allocation entails xi = x for i. Thus, total urban
production is given by
Yu = xI1/γ − ψI = zIF u(
Lu
I
,
Nu
I
)I1/γ − ψI (11)
= zIF u(Lu, Nu)I
1−γ
γ − ψI
Futhermore, since the cost and benefits of the number of varieties only impact urban
output, Yu, the eﬃcient number of varieties is the one that maximizes Yu. The first
order optimality condition for I is given by 1−γγ I
1−γ
γ zIF (Lu, Nu) = ψI,which can also
be written as:
I =
µ
1− γ
γ
zIF u(Lu, Nu)
ψ
¶ γ
2γ−1
.
Substituting this expression into (11) and simplifying produces:
Yu = zuF u(Lu, Nu)µ
where µ ≡ γ
2γ−1 > 1 (by Assumption 1) is the degree of increasing returns and zu ≡³
2γ−1
γ
´³
1−γ
γ
1
ψ
´ 1−γ
2γ−1
z
γ
2γ−1
I . Thus, an eﬃcient allocation in this environment is one that
maximizes aggregate (and percapita) consumption, or:
C(N) ≡ max
0≤Lr≤L
0≤Nr≤N
G [zrF r(Lr, Nr), zuF u(L− Lr, N −Nr)µ] (12)
Consider first an interior solution. It satisfies:
Lr : G1zrF rL = G2µzuF
u(µ−1)F uL ;
Nr : G1zrF rN = G2µzuF
u(µ−1)F uN .
Dividing the second condition by the first one obtains lr = φlu. Moreover, since L =
Lr + Lu then l = lr(1 − nu) + lunu where nu ≡ NuN . From these last two equations it
follows that:
lu = lu(nu) =
l
φ (1− nu) + nu
(13)
lr = φlu(nu) (14)
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One can now rewrite (12) as
C(N) ≡ maxG [zrF r(lr, 1)Nr, zuF u(lu, 1)µNµu ]
= maxG [zrF r(lr, 1) (1− nu)N, zuF u(lu, 1)µnµuNµ]
= maxG [zrf r(lr) (1− nu)N, zufu(lu)µnµuNµ]
Finally, using (13) and (14), one obtains (7). Finally, consider corner solutions. In
those cases, (13) and (14) does not need to hold, as assumed by (7). However, in those
cases, (13) and (14) become an irrelevant normalization. To see this, consider a case
in which N∗r = 0 in (12). This is idential to the solution in which nu = 1 in (7). In
both cases, C(N) = G [zufu(L,N)µ] . Similarly for N∗r = N.
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Figure 6
Malthus to Romer Model:  θ=1
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Figure 7
Malthus to Romer  θ<1
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Figure 8
Malthus to Romer: The Great Discoveries
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(a) Spain (b) Britain
c*
c(N)
c'(N)
c'(N
c(N)
N**
1640
YEAR 1400 1450 1500 1550 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800
Population (Thousands) 6008 6392 6800 7485 8240 8505 8770 9579 13026
Population (Annual Growth) 0.12% 0.12% 0.19% 0.19% 0.06% 0.06% 0.18% 0.62%
GDP Percapita (1990 International $) 698 698 698 793 900 900 900 965 1034
GDP Percapita (Annual Growth) 0.00% 0.00% 0.25% 0.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.14% 0.14%
Share of Urban Population 26.3 22.4 18.4 19.9 21.3 20.8 20.3 21.4 19.5
Population (Thousands) 2640 2600 2560 3240 4400 5610 5510 6260 9170
Population (Annual Growth) -0.03% -0.03% 0.47% 0.61% 0.49% -0.04% 0.26% 0.77%
GDP Percapita (1990 International $) 714 714 714 834 974 1129 1250 1423 1621
GDP Percapita (Annual Growth) 0.00% 0.00% 0.31% 0.31% 0.30% 0.20% 0.26% 0.26%
Share of Urban Population 3.1 4.0 3.2 4.7 6.1 10.8 13.4 17.5 24.1
Sources: Population for Britain is from Clark (2005) and correspond to England only. 
Population for Spain for the years 1400, 1750 and 1800 is from Bairoch et al. (1988, Table B5).
The remaining GDP and Population figures are from Maddison (2003), and blanks are filled
using simple interporlations except Britain 1650, which uses the growth rate of Clark's real wage.
Rates of urbanization for England after 1500 are from Wrigley (1985, Table 5). The remaining figures
are from Bairoch et al. (1988, Table b5). All remaining blanks are filled using simple interpolation.
Britain
Table 1
Population, GDP Percapita and Urban Population
Spain and Britain
Spain
